Bilateral Bargaining Game and Fuzzy Logic in a System Handling SLA-Based Workflows by Quan, Dang Minh & Altmann, Jorn
Bilateral Bargaining Game and Fuzzy Logic in the System Handling SLA-Based
Workflow
Dang Minh Quan†
†‡International University in Germany









In the business Grid, the owner of a workflow is assumed
to ask an SLA Workflow broker to execute the workflow for
him. The price for executing a workflow on the Grid is ne-
gotiated between the user and the broker. Determining a
price that satisfies both, the user and the SLA workflow bro-
ker, is a difficult task. This paper proposes a method using
bilateral bargaining game model based on fuzzy logic to
determine the price that the user and the broker could ac-
cept after the first negotiation round. We also analyze many
parameters affecting the price determination process. The
validation results show that the approach is suitable with
business rules.
1. Introduction
In Grid Computing environment, there are some users
that do not have any time constraints on the execution of
their application. That means they are willing to wait for
the result of their computing task. However, many users
need the result of the computation within a specific period
of time. They are willing to pay to have their work finished
on time. This agreement is legalized by signing a Service
Level Agreement (SLA)[2]. SLAs are defined as an explicit
statement of expectations and obligations in a business re-
lationship between service providers and customers.
An SLA workflow broker help users to perform many te-
dious tasks such as selecting the suitable resource provider
for each sub-job, monitoring the running sub-jobs, and han-
dling errors. We proposed a business model for the sys-
tem depicted in Figure 1 [1, 4]. Within this business model,
there are three types of entities: end-user, SLA broker, and
service provider.
The end-user asks the broker to execute the workflow
















Figure 1. Stakeholders and their business rela-
tionship
for the workflow execution service. If there are problems
with the workflow execution, for example the deadline is
violated, the user will ask for compensation from the broker.
The SLA workflow broker has to perform mapping
of sub-jobs to resources, signing SLAs with the services
providers, monitoring, and error recovery. When the work-
flow execution has finished, it pays the service providers
and charges the end-user. The profit of the broker is the
difference between both. The value-add that the broker pro-
vides is the handling of all the tasks for the end-user.
The service providers execute the sub-jobs of the work-
flow. In our business model, we assume that each service
provider fixes the price for its resources at the time of the
SLA negotiation.
One workflow has many parameters such as number of
input, output data, required CPU speed, required number of
memory, required number of storage, QoS, execution dura-
tion and so on. With each user, one or some of those param-
eters are modified to fit with the specific requirement. As
far as we know, there is rarely more than one user having
the identical workflow.
In the early phase of business Grid, the scale of the Grid
is small and the number of SLA workflow brokers is also
small. Even when the Grid has large scale, some local Grid
organizations such as DEISA [6] still exist. When the local
Grid organization establishes an SLA workflow broker ser-
vice, this broker could have many supports about technique
and pricing policy from the local Grid community. It is ob-
vious that those users of this Grid should choose this broker
as default.
The scenario described above illustrated a market with
one user and one broker. This is the ideal condition for
bilateral bargaining. The user wants to have a price as low
as possible while the broker wants to maximize its profit.
Thus, the central problem is how to set the appropriate price
that both user and broker can accept. This paper, which
belongs to a continued effort to build the basic theory for
a system handling SLA-based workflows [3, 4], proposes
a solution to this problem. In this paper, we focus on the
bilateral relation between a user and a broker. The market
structure is not considered. It is outside the scope of this
paper. The contributions of the paper comprise:
• Analysis of the bargaining game with asymmetric im-
patience between user and broker.
• Analysis of parameters such as the critical of the work-
flow, the Grid state and so on contributing to the price
making decision.
• Method of fuzzy logic to determine the price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the related works, while Section 3 and 4 analyze the bar-
gaining game and the fuzzy logic, respectively. Section 5
presents the validation, and Section 6 concludes the paper
with a short summary.
2. Related works
The literature comprises many ideas for supporting QoS
for workflows such as ICENI [5], QoS-aware Grid Work-
flows [7], and Spooner‘s Performance Aware Workflow
Management [12]. However, none of them define a business
model for their system. There are also many Grid projects
working on SLA issues [9]. Most of them focus on single
jobs and, thus, only on the direct relation between users and
service providers. The business role of the broker in such
systems has not been fully examined. Moreover, bargaining
has not been considered in all of the above works.
Sim et. al. developed a market-driven bargaining strat-
egy for G-negotiation agents [10] and describe the price set-
ting and adjusting along multiple negotiation steps among
customer agents and provider agents. The key difference
between our work and the work in [10] is that our work at-
tempts to determine a suitable price at the first negotiation
round while Sim et. al. try to reach the suitable price after
many negotiation rounds.
In [11], the authors present the fuzzy judgment theory.
It is used for describing and analyzing buyer-seller bargain-
ing conditions and the price determination processes. Given
the players’ initial utility structure, thirteen distinct situa-
tions in the negotiation space have been identified and de-
scribed formally. Each situation defines a particular negoti-
ation space and a settlement price range. However, the work
of Roszkowska et. al. does not analyze in deep any partic-
ular situation with respect to the impact of certain factors
on the decision making process. Our work focuses on the
situation of asymmetric situation.
3. Bargaining game of the price negotiation
The cost of running the same workflow is different
through time. Assume that after many times running the
same workflow, the user knows the highest cost Ch of run-
ning the workflow. Thus, Ch is the highest price that the
user can pay for the workflow execution. The broker maps
the workflow to the available resources to determine the
base price Cl of running the workflow. Cl includes the cost
of buying the resources from the service providers and the
cost for the broker service itself. The broker will not accept
to run the workflow if the user’s offer is less than Cl. If
Cl > Ch the trading will not happen at all. For the case
that Cl < Ch, the cost calculation is presented in Figure
2. As the broker is a business entity, he also wants to gain
profit. Thus, the actual price of the service C will satisfy
Cl ≤ C ≤ Ch. It is also possible in the business envi-
ronment that the seller tells the customer about the based
cost and the market state to persuade the customer about his
proposed price. Similar to that, we can assume that the bro-
ker tells the user about the based cost Cl and the Grid state.
The case that broker does not want to tell the user about this









Figure 2. Pricing schema of the game
During the negotiation phase, broker and user will do
bargaining over the division of the surplus Ch − Cl using
alternate offers. The duration of the negotiation process is
limited, since there is a fixed start time of the workflow. It
is also assumed that each negotiation round needs one time
slot for user to analyze the change of the SLA content or
for broker to find an appropriate mapping solution. Con-
sidering these conditions, we can say that both, broker and
user, are impatient. However, the level of user’s impatience
is different from the broker’s impatience. This is discussed
in more detail in Section 4. Consequently, we can say that
this situation is a bargaining game with asymmetric impa-
tience [8]. The participants will accept the offer when they
are exactly indifferent about accepting or rejecting it.
We also assume that the cost of delaying an agreement by
one round reduces the trade gain of the user by pu percent
and the gain of the broker by pb percent . This cost relates
to the opportunity cost. pu and pb are common knowledge
of the user and the broker because all related information is
revealed. The 1−p percent is defined as the discount factor.
We call du % (du = 1 − pu), db % (db = 1 − pb) as the
discount factor of the user and the broker respectively.
Assume that the game can take place in N rounds. Con-
sider the last sub-game, the game in the final round N ,
where the broker offers a price Ch and the user accepts it.
The reason is that if the user does not accept, his utility will
be reduced seriously because of the lateness. Thus, at this
sub-game, the share surplus of the broker SbN=100 % and
the share surplus of the user SuN=0%. Now, we move back
the subgame at round (N −1)th beginning with user’s offer.
As the user knows that delaying the negotiation one more
round can waste the broker pb % of his share surplus, the
user offers the broker a share surplus as in Formula 1 and
the broker should accept it.
SbN−1 = SbN ∗ (1 − pb) = SbN ∗ db (1)
At the subgame at round (N − 2)th beginning with bro-
ker’s offer, the broker also knows that delaying the negoti-
ation one more round can waste the user pu % of his share
surplus, the broker offers the user a share surplus as in for-
mula 2 and the user should accept it.
SuN−2 = SuN−1 ∗ (1 − pu) = SuN−1 ∗ du (2)
Using the backward deduction like above we can com-
pute the price at the first round. It is the ideal proposed price
for both user and broker. From the analysis, we can see that
the discount factor is the key issue in the price determination
process. The discount factor depends on many variables:
the remaining time period, the urgency of the workflow and
the Grid state. We will apply fuzzy logic to determine the
discount factor as described in Section 4.
4. Fuzzy logic to determine the discount factor
The overall architecture of the price negotiation process
using fuzzy logic is presented in Figure 3.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the fuzzy logic engine re-
ceives the remaining time period and the workflow critical
level from the user, the Grid state from the mapping mod-
















Figure 3. The architecture of using fuzzy logic
in the price negotiation process
will compute the discount factors du and db and provides
it to the negotiation module. The negotiation module uses
du, db, Cl, Ch to compute the cost of executing the work-
flow and then proposes to the user.
4.1. Membership function of the input pa-
rameters
4.1.1 Remaining time period
The remaining time period has five levels: Very Low (VL),
Low (L) Medium (M), High (H) and Very High (VH). The
level is determined based on the ability to re-negotiate with
the broker. As each negotiation round needs about 1 time
slot, 9 time slots are the safe period for the user to change
a lot of things. Thus, if the remaining time period is greater
than or equal to 9, it is considered as Very High. In contrast,
if the remaining time period is 1 time slots, the user has 1
time slot to recognize what should be change and 0 time
slot to negotiate with the broker. Thus, the period of 1 time
slot is quite dangerous for the user and is considered as Very
Low. The level of the remaining time is mapped to the real
value as presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Membership function of the remaining
time periods
4.1.2 State of the Grid
The Grid state has five levels: Very Busy (VB), Busy (B),
Medium (M), Lightly-Used (LU), and Free (F). The level is
determined based on the number of feasible solutions that
the Workflow broker can find for the workflow, using the
H-Map algorithm. In particular, this number corresponds
to the number of feasible solutions in the reference set cre-
ated by the H-Map algorithm [3]. If the number of feasi-
ble solution is low, this means the Grid is busy. Call nf is
the number of feasible solutions, nt is the total number of
configurations in the reference set. The Grid state level is
mapped to the rate (nf/nt) as presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Membership function of the Grid state
4.1.3 Urgency of the workflow
The urgency of the workflow has five levels: Very Low
(VL), Low (L) Medium (M), High (H) and Very High (VH).
The user selects the discrete value for the urgency of work-
flow. The membership function of the workflow urgency is
illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Membership function of the workflow
critical
4.2. Effect of input parameters on the dis-
count factors
In this section, we will analyze the effect of input pa-
rameters on the user discount factor and the broker discount
factor. These effects are expressed as fuzzy inference rules.
For the broker, the discount factor depends on the ability of
attracting users to use the broker service. If the ability of
attracting user is high, the discount factor is low, and vice
versa. For the user, the discount factor is mainly based on
the utility of making the workflow deadline. If the proba-
bility of delaying the deadline is high, the discount factor is
low, and vice versa.
Table 1. Effect of Grid state on the broker dis-
count factor
Grid state F LU M B VB
Discount VL L M H VH
Table 2. Effect of Grid state on the user dis-
count factor
Grid state HF F M B VB
Discount VH H M L VL
4.2.1 State of the Grid
Effect on the broker: The Grid state effects the policy of
attracting user to use the Grid. When the Grid is free, this
means that only a small number of customers use the Grid at
that time. Thus, the broker wants to attract more users using
the Grid. If the negotiation takes a long time, the negotiation
could annoy the user and, therefore, could negatively effect
the success of attracting users. Thus, the discount factor
of the broker is low. The discount factor is high when the
Grid is busy and low when the Grid is free. The assumption
about effect of the Grid state on the broker discount factor
is shown in Tab 1.
Effect on the user: The Grid state affects the ability of
finding a feasible mapping solution for the workflow. When
the Grid state is busy, at time slot t, the broker finds out
a feasible mapping solution. If the negotiation process ex-
tends longer to time slot t+1, the probability for the broker
to find out a feasible mapping solution is small. Because
the number of free resources is small, just another resource
demand within [t, t + 1] can eliminate greatly the available
resource space of the workflow. Thus, the effect of the Grid
state to the discount factor of the user is summarized in Ta-
ble 2.
4.2.2 The urgency of the workflow
Effect on the broker: The urgency of the workflow does
not affect the discount factor of the broker.
Effect on the user: The urgency of the workflow ef-
fects the ability of finding a feasible mapping solution for
the workflow. When the critical of the workflow is high, it
will require high quality resources. If the negotiation pro-
cess extends longer, the probability of loosing the feasible
found solution is very big. Because the space of suitable
Grid resources is small, just another resource demand can
greatly eliminate the feasible solution space of the work-
flow. Therefore, the discount factor is low when the critical
Table 3. Effect of the urgency to the user dis-
count factor
Critical VL L M H VH
Discount VH H M L VL
Table 4. Effect of remaining time period to the
user discount factor
Time VS S M L VL
Discount VL L M H VH
of the workflow is high and vice versa. It is summarized in
Table 3.
4.2.3 Remaining time period
Effect on the broker: The big or small remaining time pe-
riod does not effect the broker’s ability of attracting user.
Effect on the user: The remaining time period effects
the utility of the user through the probability of ensuring the
deadline for the workflow. When the time remaining period
is small and the negotiation time extends longer, the user
will face the big probability of not starting the workflow on
time. The effect of the remaining time period to the discount
factor of the user is summarized in Table 4.
4.3. Membership function of the output
The output of the fuzzy logic system are the discount
factors for the user and for the broker. For both of them, we
use the membership functions as presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Membership function of the output
To determine the crisp value of the discount factor, we
use the popular RSS (Root Mean Square) and centroid
methods.
5. Algorithm to calculate the price
The algorithm to calculate the proposed price includes
following steps:
Step 1: Get the urgency level of the workflow from user,
compute the remaining time period, determine the highest
cost of executing the workflow Ch.
Step 2: Use the H-Map algorithm to get the Grid state
and the cost for providers.
Step 3: Compute the broker service cost. For example,
this cost could be computed in a simple way for example
k% of the cost for providers.
Step 4: Compute the surplus share between broker and
user using the procedure presented in Figure 8. At each
remaining time period value, we compute the discount fac-
tor and then determine the share. In the procedure, we use
the Grid state determined at the negotiation time for all re-
maining time period value. As the Grid state could only be
remained or become busier along the time and the affection
of Grid state to user is greater than broker, the share for user
will be slightly bigger than the equilibrium. It is an incen-
tive for user to accept the proposed price.
Share_broker=1
Share_user=0
For I=1 To (time Remaining /2)
{
     Compute The Disc_brk,  Disc_user Using Fuzzy
      With Remaining Time = 2*i -1 And Grid State In Step 2
     Share_broker= Share_broker* Disc_brk
     Share_user=1- Share_broker
     Compute The Disc_brk,  Disc_user Using Fuzzy
      With Remaining Time = 2*i And Grid State In Step 2
     Share_user= Share_broker* Disc_user
     Share_broker=1- Share_user
}
Figure 8. Algorithm for computing the surplus
share
Step 5: Compute and propose the final price to the other
party.
6. Validation
The goal of this task is to validate the impact of the input
parameters to the discount factor and the surplus share. In
the first place, we set all the parameters to medium value.
After that, we change each input parameter from very low
value to very high value. The discount factor and the surplus
share of both user and broker are recorded.
In Figure 9a, we can see if the Grid is free, the broker
reduces its share surplus to attract more users. Figure 9b
shows that if the urgency of the workflow is high, the bro-
ker will get a larger part of the share surplus. It is suitable
with the practical business. In Figure 9c, we can see the dis-
count factor of the broker does not depend on the remaining
time period while the discount factor of the user increases
along the increases of the remaining time period. The sur-


































































































































c) Effect of the remaining time period to the discount factor and the surplus share
Figure 9. Validation result
along the increase of the remaining time period. This result
is suitable with the game analyzed in section 3.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a mechanism to determine the price
for executing an SLA-based workflow in an Grid environ-
ment. The mechanism calculates a price that can be ac-
cepted at the first negotiation round by the user and the bro-
ker. In particular, we modelled the problem as a bilateral
bargaining game with asymmetric impatience. We analyzed
three parameters that effect the price setting process. They
are the remaining time period, the urgency of the workflow,
and the Grid state. We used fuzzy logic to combine the ef-
fects of those parameters. The simulation results confirm
that the mechanism is compatible with theory and practical
business.
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